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ABSTRACT
The underlying issues relating to the usability and security of mul-
tiple passwords are largely unexplored. However, we know that
people generally have difficulty remembering multiple passwords.
This reduces security since users reuse the same password for dif-
ferent systems or reveal other passwords as they try to log in. We
report on a laboratory study comparing recall of multiple text pass-
words with recall of multiple click-based graphical passwords. In
a one-hour session (short-term), we found that participants in the
graphical password condition coped significantly better than those
in the text password condition. In particular, they made fewer errors
when recalling their passwords, did not resort to creating passwords
directly related to account names, and did not use similar passwords
across multiple accounts. After two weeks, participants in the two
conditions had recall success rates that were not statistically differ-
ent from each other, but those with text passwords made more re-
call errors than participants with graphical passwords. In our study,
click-based graphical passwords were significantly less susceptible
to multiple password interference in the short-term, while having
comparable usability to text passwords in most other respects.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of computing and information systems]:
Security and protection: Authentication
General Terms
Security, Human Factors
Keywords
authentication, graphical passwords, multiple password interfer-
ence, usable security
1. INTRODUCTION
Special consideration is required to design usable, understand-
able, and manageable security features. At first glance, it seems
like applying standard usability and Human-Computer Interaction
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(HCI) principles should suffice, but security constraints make this
problematic. Most importantly, some design features that might
make a system more usable would also make it less secure. Ad-
dressing these security weaknesses can too easily render the soft-
ware unusable again. Even worse, one might argue that an unusable
security system is inherently insecure, since users will then misuse
or bypass the security mechanisms. One must also consider how
the design affects the observable behaviour of legitimate users, in
case such behaviour could be exploited by attackers. The challenge
is to design software that is both secure and usable [10].
In this paper, we address an important issue in user authentica-
tion software: the memorability of multiple passwords. Authenti-
cation software supports legitimate users in gaining access to sys-
tems or resources by verifying their credentials. We focus on pass-
words, the most common form of credentials. The problem with
passwords is making them easy for legitimate users to remember,
but difficult for attackers to guess. Alternatives to passwords in-
clude physical tokens or biometrics; these also have problems, such
as cost, management, and privacy, which we will not address in the
paper. As passwords are the most common method of authenti-
cation, the password problem is important, and is made worse by
the increasing number of users and the number of different systems
they access [15,18]. In particular, users now need to remember not
just one password, but many. This places a significant memory load
on users, leading them to choose (and reuse) simple passwords that
are easy for attackers to guess. Despite this reality, there has been
little work investigating the issues relating to multiple passwords.
Our current work is motivated by recent proposals for alterna-
tive kinds of passwords, particularly click-based graphical pass-
words [3, 39]. In such systems, the user does not enter a text pass-
word using a keyboard, but instead clicks on particular points on an
image. Such graphical passwords are intended to take advantage
of the human ability to more easily recognize and recall images
than textual information [29]. We wished to study whether this ap-
proach had advantages over text passwords when multiple distinct
passwords were necessary. We were concerned about the potential
for multiple password interference, where remembering a password
for one system might affect the user’s memory of a password for
another system. As described in the cognitive psychology litera-
ture [2], memory interference is “the impaired ability to remember
an item when it is similar to other items stored in memory”.
Our study was conducted in a laboratory setting where 65 partic-
ipants were assigned to use either textual or graphical passwords.
They created six distinct passwords for several different “accounts”,
and later had to recall the passwords for each account in a different
order than they were created. Twenty-six of those participants also
returned after two weeks to test recall of these passwords. In the
case of graphical passwords, each account was associated with a
different image, so participants had one image per password. Liter-
ature on memory research acknowledges that ceiling effects, such
as high success rates that mask differences between conditions, are
a problem which must be overcome with careful experimental de-
sign in order to get meaningful results [22]. While our study does
not mirror real-life usage of passwords, the intent of the experiment
was to highlight differences in performance.
We found that in the short-term, participants had more difficulty
recalling multiple text passwords than multiple graphical passwords.
However, after two weeks, both groups had significant difficulty
remembering their passwords and there was no statistical differ-
ence in success rates. We further found that participants in the text
condition could more easily recall their passwords when they used
insecure password practices, such as choosing passwords that fol-
lowed a common pattern or that were obviously associated with ac-
count names. For example, 40% of text passwords were obviously
related to their associated account. These results constitute evi-
dence for an important advantage inherent in click-based graphical
passwords – built-in cueing that helps with memorability – while
text password systems encourage users to adopt insecure coping
strategies. In post-hoc analysis, we found that males were more
successful than females with graphical passwords and that males
were more likely to use account-related text passwords. These re-
sults align with psychology literature showing that males perform
better at visual-spatial tasks and more weakly in linguistic tasks
than females [5,23]. The results of this paper motivate further study
in field settings and deeper examination of the underlying human
factors issues involved in using these authentication mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides background on the type of graphical password system used,
memory cueing, and multiple password interference. In Sections 3
and 4, we outline our hypotheses, describe the methodology of our
study, and present the results. We discuss validation of our hy-
potheses in Section 5. Lastly, we offer some discussion and con-
cluding remarks in Sections 6 and 7.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Security is rarely a user’s primary task [37], and typically in-
volves an extra step in addition to the main task, such as having to
log in to read one’s email. Users need security features to be as
non-disruptive as possible, but still need them to work properly to
preserve integrity and privacy. A second unusual characteristic of
security software is that it attracts illegitimate users of the system
who are actively trying to gain unauthorized access. These attack-
ers will take advantage of all information available. Usable security
software must therefore offer assistance to legitimate users, with-
out giving assistance to attackers. In particular, this changes the
nature of feedback in interaction design, which must inform legiti-
mate users while revealing no useful information to others.
With any authentication system where users are expected to re-
call information to log in, there is a risk of memory interference.
Multiple password interference occurs when users must remem-
ber passwords for many systems and the memories of the differ-
ent passwords interfere with each other. Studies have shown that
users typically create easy-to-guess text passwords and reuse these
passwords across several accounts [1, 15, 18]. When trying to log
in, they will cycle through their passwords until they find one that
works. Gaw and Felten [18] report that users in their lab study tried
an average of 2.43 passwords before a correct login. This may be
under-reporting the problem, however, because users in their study
were only allowed 90 seconds per account. While this trial-and-
error approach helps users deal with password systems and multi-
ple password interference, revealing all of one’s passwords at every
login can amplify security risks, for example in the presence of key
loggers or when passwords are sent to phishing sites.
One proposed solution to the password problem is to use a pass-
word manager. With a password manager, users typically have one
master password and the password manager creates, stores, and en-
ters passwords for individual accounts on behalf of the user. The
individual passwords are typically much more random than what
users would select on their own and are thus stronger against at-
tack. However, implementations of some password managers have
usability problems [9] that can leave users even more vulnerable
than when they were managing passwords themselves. A second
drawback is that a centralized scheme has a new single point of fail-
ure: if attackers gain access to the master password, they now have
control over all of the user’s accounts. While password managers
may be appropriate in some circumstances, authentication schemes
that are both secure and memorable are still needed.
We are interested in the graphical password approach. It has
been suggested that graphical passwords may be less susceptible to
multiple password interference since humans have better memory
for recognizing and recalling images than text [24, 31]. Surveys of
graphical passwords circa 2005 are available from Suo et al. [32]
and from Monrose and Reiter [26]. Proposed schemes include
click-based graphical passwords such as PassPoints [39]. Many
of these have the added advantage of presenting a cue to the user to
help trigger the appropriate memory. Cued-recall has been estab-
lished as an easier memory task than uncued recall [29, 34]. With
cued-recall, the system provides a cue to help prompt the user’s
memory of the password (or a portion thereof). This is a desirable
usability feature that reduces the memory load on users. With click-
based graphical passwords, a password consists of user-selected
click-points on the images presented. Therefore, the images act
as mnemonic cues to remember the corresponding click-points.
In PassPoints, users are presented with an image, and a pass-
word consists of 5 click-points on the image (see Figure 1). To
log in, users must select the same 5 click-points in the same or-
der. The system allows for a tolerance area around each click-point
so that approximately correct login attempts are accepted. Several
user studies and security analyses have been conducted on Pass-
Points [6, 13, 20, 33, 38–40]. While these have found PassPoints
to be generally usable, security concerns have been raised because
users tend to select predictable passwords which are exploitable in
dictionary attacks [13, 30, 33]. Newer click-based graphical pass-
word schemes, such as Persuasive Cued Click-Points [7,8], address
two important security concerns with respect to user selected pass-
words [11]: they offer a significant reduction in hotspots (i.e., areas
of the image that have higher probability of being selected by users)
and in the use of click-point patterns (such as selecting click-points
that form a straight line across the image). These characteristics
significantly reduce vulnerability to dictionary attacks. The present
paper uses the better-known PassPoints scheme for these interfer-
ence tests, in order to leverage a more closely-examined and un-
derstood password scheme and to build on existing results [6] on
interference between two passwords only (see below).
A few studies have compared text passwords to graphical pass-
words, but in these cases, users only had one password to remem-
ber (either text or graphical). Wiedenbeck et al. [39] compared user
performance of text passwords and PassPoints in a lab study. Their
results were mixed, but slightly favoured text passwords. Koman-
duri and Hutchings’s study [21] compared text passwords to their
newly proposed picture-password scheme. They found better mem-
orability for their picture-passwords although the results were not
statistically significant due to a small user sample.
Figure 1: A PassPoints password consists of 5 ordered click-
points (the numbered labels do not appear in practice).
To our knowledge, there is little published work examining the
problem of multiple password interference, despite the growing
number of passwords held by most users. Moncur and Lepatre [25]
compared VIP, a recognition-based graphical password scheme in
which users select their images from a set of decoys, to a graph-
ical variation of 4-digit PINs (Personal Identification Numbers).
While they showed that users were slightly more likely to recall
5 VIP passwords than PINs, it is unclear how this compares to
text passwords. Passwords in their study were not associated with
any “accounts”, and the study did not take into consideration se-
rial memory effects. Recently, Everitt et al. [14] investigated how
interference and frequency of access affected memorability of 4
recognition-based PassFaces [11] passwords. They found that in-
frequently accessed passwords were more difficult to remember
and that users performed better when they had a chance to prac-
tice each new password individually over several days rather than
learning several at once. Both of these studies focus solely on
usability and do not consider the security of the schemes them-
selves or whether changes in user behaviour when dealing with
multiple passwords may affect the security of the system (although
passwords were assigned in the PassFaces study to eliminate user
choice).
Multiple password interference was also examined as part of a
field study of PassPoints [6]. In this study, a subset of participants
had two distinct passwords to remember (on two different images).
These participants had lower login success rates than those with
only one password. We are not aware of comparable studies for
regular text passwords, so it is unknown how this performance de-
crease compares with text passwords. Vu et al. [36] conducted lab
studies examining the effect of various text password restrictions on
memorability when multiple passwords were used. Their results in-
clude that users with five passwords had more difficulty than those
who had only three, that some users selected passwords with ob-
vious connection to their accounts, and that password restrictions
were not sufficient for encouraging secure text password selection.
3. STUDY DETAILS
We hypothesized that click-based graphical passwords would be
easier for users to recall than text passwords when users had mul-
tiple passwords to remember. In other words, there would be less
interference from multiple unique graphical passwords than multi-
ple unique text passwords. Although many variants of graphical
passwords and text passwords were available, we began our in-
vestigation with regular text passwords, where users were free to
select any password, and PassPoints, the click-based graphical sys-
tem that had been most closely evaluated to-date. Our experiment
compared multiple password interference for these two conditions:
the Text condition (MText) and the PassPoints condition (MPP).
Our specific hypotheses with respect to multiple password inter-
ference were:
1. Participants will have lower recall success rates with text
passwords than with PassPoints passwords.
2. Participants in the Text condition are more likely than Pass-
Points participants to use patterns across their own passwords.
3. Participants will recall text passwords more slowly than Pass-
Points passwords.
4. Participants in the Text condition are more likely than Pass-
Points participants to create passwords that are directly re-
lated to their corresponding accounts.
5. Participants in the Text condition will make more recall er-
rors than participants in the PassPoints condition.
We conducted a lab study with 65 participants (26 males and 39
females). Participants completed their sessions individually. This
study used a between-subjects design and had two conditions; half
of the participants were randomly assigned to the Text password
condition and half to the PassPoints password condition. All par-
ticipants were familiar with text passwords, but no participant in
the PassPoints condition had any previous experience with graphi-
cal passwords. Participants were primarily university students from
various degree programs. All were regular internet users, but none
were experts in computer security.
Programs for the Text and PassPoints conditions were imple-
mented as stand-alone Windows applications and displayed on a
17-inch screen. The PassPoints application used 451x331 pixel im-
ages, tolerance areas of 19x19 pixels, and 5 click-points. This con-
figuration is consistent with previous studies [6, 39]. The images
are identified as: Cars, Mural, Philadelphia, Pool, Statue, and Truck
(Figures 2 to 7). These were images from a previous PassPoints lab
study [6] and shown to have average to good usability and security.
A PassPoints system using this configuration has a theoretical pass-
word space of 244 possible passwords. The Text password system
enforced an 8-character minimum, but no other restrictions were
imposed; this gives a theoretical password space of 252. While 32
special characters are available on a standard keyboard, most users
use a very small subset of these special characters. In fact, there
is evidence that they do not even realize that these can be included
in a password or know how to type them [16]. While these spe-
cial characters are included in the theoretical password space, it is
highly improbable that passwords contain any of them. The the-
oretical password space of PassPoints could be enlarged to match
that of text passwords through different system configuration, but
we chose to maintain compatibility with previous studies. Reduc-
ing the text password limit to less than 8 characters also seemed to
be a poor alternative.
3.1 Methodology
Our study included two lab-based sessions. Session 1 took one
hour and was completed by all 65 participants. For Session 2, par-
ticipant returned to the lab and tried to recall their previously cre-
ated passwords. The second session occurred after two weeks and
was completed by 26 participants.1
1Session 2 was added to our methodology after we examined the
initial results. 26 out of 28 participants recruited after this method-
ology change completed Session 2.
Figure 2: Cars image [4] Figure 3: Mural image [40]
Figure 4: Philadelphia image
[40]
Figure 5: Pool image [27]
Figure 6: Statue image [17] Figure 7: Truck image [17]
3.1.1 Session 1
The initial one-hour session was divided into three phases: Prac-
tice, Password Generation, and Retention, as shown in Table 1.
First, participants completed a Practice phase with two trials. For
each trial, they created, confirmed, and logged in with one pass-
word. This phase was used to explain the process and familiarize
participants with the user interface. During Practice phase, partic-
ipants were told that they did not need to remember their practice
passwords and would not be asked about them again.
In the Password Generation phase, participants completed 6 tri-
als where they created distinct passwords, each associated with a
different pre-defined “account”: bank, email, instant messenger,
library, online dating, and work. The accounts were identified by
coloured banners at the top of the application window that included
a unique icon and the account name (see Figures 8 and 9). In this
phase, the accounts were presented to all participants in the same
order. For PassPoints, each account was associated with a distinct
image, so participants never had more than one password per im-
age. Furthermore, the PassPoints accounts were consistently paired
with the same images (although in a real implementation, a system
would use different images for different participants and offer a
new image if a user reset a password). This design decision al-
lowed us to gather enough data on each image to assess whether
hotspots and patterns occurred as a result of having multiple pass-
words, and to remove a potential confounding variable. Participants
were asked to pick realistic passwords that they could remember
but that would be difficult for others to guess. They were further
told that they would need to remember these passwords later and
reminded that each password was created for a specific account. In
Table 1: Methodology
Phase Number of trials Steps
I. Practice 2 trials. Create
This data was not Confirm
used in the analysis. Answer Questions
Distraction
Login
II. Password 6 trials. Create
Generation Accounts were Confirm
presented in the Answer Questions
same order for all Distraction
participants. Login
III. Retention 6 trials. Recall-1
Account order was
shuffled according
to the Latin square.
IV. 2-week 6 trials. Recall-2
Retention Account order was
the same as for the
Retention phase.
Figure 8: Password creation interface (Text condition).
total, 395 account passwords were created: 204 in the Text condi-
tion and 191 in the PassPoints condition.
During the Practice and Password Generation phases, partici-
pants used the following 5-step process for each of their accounts.
1. Create. Participants created a password for the given account.
Those in the Text condition had an 8-character minimum and had to
enter their password twice (see Figure 8). The text passwords were
visible during password creation. Those in the PassPoints condition
were required to click on 5 different click-points on the provided
image (see Figure 9). The selected click-points were never made
visible to participants at any time during the study.
2. Confirm. Participants confirmed their password. For text
passwords, participants entered their password, now echoed only
as asterisks. PassPoints participants had to enter their password by
clicking on the same 5 ordered click-points, within a 19x19 pixel
tolerance area of the original click-points. If participants could not
remember their password, they could return to the Create step.
3. Answer Questions. Participants responded to two 10-point
Likert-scale questions about the perceived difficulty of creating and
remembering the current password.
4. Perform Distraction Task. A 30-second distraction task was
used to simulate a longer passage of time [19]. Participants in the
Text condition counted backwards by 3s from a random 4-digit
number, while participants in the PassPoints condition completed
a Mental Rotations Test (MRT) puzzle [28]. Different tasks were
used to clear textual working memory and visual working memory.
Figure 9: Password creation interface (PassPoints condition).
5. Login. Participants re-entered their password. They could
re-try as many times as necessary to get it correct. If they forgot
their password, they could return to the Create step.
After a short break where participants completed a demographics
questionnaire, they moved on to the Retention phase of the study.
The Retention phase tested whether participants could recall each
of their 6 passwords. The application prompted participants to log
in by displaying the account name and banner along with an entry
field for their username and a password entry field or an image,
depending on whether participants were in the Text or PassPoints
condition. Participants could re-try as many times as they wished
if they made mistakes, and an additional button was available: “I
don’t remember creating a password for this account”. In fact, we
never asked participants to enter passwords for which they had no
account, but they may have forgotten that they created a password
for a particular account.
In the Retention phase, the accounts were presented in shuffled
order based on a Latin square, where each row represented a partic-
ipant and each column represented an account. Pre-testing showed
that one hour was sufficient for the generation and later recall of 6
passwords, therefore we used a 6×6 Latin Square for determining
presentation order during the Retention phase. The Latin square en-
sures that the presentation order of the accounts is balanced across
all participants, avoiding possible bias that might otherwise result
from serial order effects.
To complete Session 1, participants answered a paper question-
naire aimed at gathering their perception of the password system
and their general attitudes towards passwords.
3.1.2 Session 2
Twenty-six participants returned to the lab 12 to 15 days after
their Session 1 to complete the second part of the study. This 2-
week Retention phase followed the same procedure as the initial
Retention phase and accounts were presented in the same order.
Participants could re-try as many times as necessary to recall their
password or decide that they had forgotten it. At the end of the
session, participants completed a short paper questionnaire.
4. RESULTS
As is the standard approach in analyzing data from user studies,
we used various statistical tests to assess whether differences in the
data reflect actual differences between conditions or whether these
may have occurred by chance. Three types of statistical tests for
significance were used in the present analysis, each intended to de-
termine whether the groups being analyzed were distinct from each
other with respect to the factor being tested. We used t-tests to com-
pare variance of the means between two groups, Mann-Whitney
tests to compare ordered categorical data (e.g., Likert scale responses,
where the choices are discrete and ordered, but it cannot be as-
sumed that participants view all pairs of adjacent levels as equidis-
tant), and Chi-square (χ2) tests to compare non-ordered categorical
or nominal data (e.g., comparing login success/fail ratios). In all
cases, we regard a value of p < .05 as indicating that the groups
being tested are different from each other with at least 95% proba-
bility, making the result statistically significant. In the tables, “not
significant” indicates that the test revealed no statistically signifi-
cant differences between the two conditions (i.e., p > .05).
4.1 Success Rates
We first examine success rates as a measure of participants’ per-
formance. The success rate is the number of successful password
entry attempts divided by the total number of attempts, across all
participants. We calculate the success rates specifically for the first
attempt in a given step, after 3 attempts, and then consider all at-
tempts. During Password Generation, participants could confirm
and login with Text and PassPoints passwords equally well (see Ta-
ble 2). There was no statistically significant difference in success
rates between conditions for this phase of the study. These results
are similar to previous studies [6, 16] with the same methodology.
Recall-1. During Recall-1, we found a significant difference in
success rates between the Text and PassPoints conditions. Partici-
pants in the PassPoints condition were significantly more likely to
successfully recall their password than those in the Text condition.
As reported in Table 2, when we consider only the first attempt for
each password, participants recalled their text password correctly
only 68% of the time while those in the PassPoints condition had
a 95% success rate. Participants could try recalling their password
as many times as they wished, until they either succeeded or gave
up. Participants in the Text condition reached an 88% success rate
with multiple recall attempts, compared to 99% for PassPoints par-
ticipants. This means that for 12% of trials in the Text condition,
participants eventually said they could not recall their password.
Only 1% of trials in the PassPoints condition ended with such a
failure to recall. Very high success rates in many categories indi-
cate that participants’ memory was not strongly taxed during Ses-
sion 1. However, this makes the much lower success rate for recall
in the Text condition all that more remarkable.
Recall-2. During Recall-2, participants in both conditions had
difficulty remembering their passwords (see Table 2), perhaps indi-
cating that this was a more difficult memory task. Two weeks after
creating their passwords, only 70% of Text participants and 57% of
PassPoints participants were able to successfully recall their pass-
words. The differences in success rates between the two conditions
were not statistically significant.
We took a closer look at the Recall-2 data to understand where
the difficulties arose. We found that male participants were signifi-
cantly more likely to successfully recall their PassPoints passwords
Table 2: Success rates for the Confirm, Login, Recall-1, and Recall-2 steps. MText indicates Multiple Text password and MPP
indicates Multiple PassPoints passwords.
Password Generation Retention
Confirm Login Recall-1 Recall-2
MText MPP MText MPP MText MPP χ2 MText MPP χ2
First Attempt 98% 95% 96% 100% 68% 95% χ2(1, 395) = 46.68, p < .001 30% 38% not significant
Within 3 Attempts 99% 99% 99% 100% 84% 99% χ2(1, 395) = 27.96, p < .001 59% 57% not significant
Multiple Attempts 100% 99% 99% 100% 88% 99% χ2(1, 395) = 18.43, p < .001 70% 57% not significant
than women. As shown in Table 3, 71% of males correctly en-
tered their PassPoints password within 3 attempts as opposed to
only 40% of female participants. This result aligns with psychol-
ogy research which continues to show that males tend to perform
better at visual-spatial tasks, while females generally have better
performance with linguistic tasks [5,23]. Although this gender dif-
ference was not apparent in the success rates for Text passwords,
males were more likely to employ a coping mechanism to help re-
member their text passwords (see Section 4.4).
4.2 Recall Errors
We now focus on the Retention phase and examine the types of
errors committed by participants trying to recall their passwords.
Recall-1. As shown in Table 4, participants had more difficulty
recalling text passwords than PassPoints passwords (t(238.47) =
5.428, p < .001) during Recall-1.2 In total, participants in the
Text condition made 173 errors, while participants in the Pass-
Points condition made 17 errors. Participants who were unsuccess-
ful could re-try as many times as they wished, so there could be
many more errors than trials.
Each group committed different types of errors. Participants in
the Text condition appeared to be more affected by interference
from multiple passwords during Session 1. In the Text condition,
20 out of 34 participants made recall errors. They often tried pass-
words from other accounts when asked to recall a password for
a particular account. Many participants cycled through several of
their passwords before reaching the correct one or giving up. In
these cases, they either entered the exact password for another ac-
count, some variant of the exact password, or a variant of a pass-
word for another account. For example one user had “870103zx”
as a password, but repeatedly entered “zx870103’, although even if
entered correctly this password would have been incorrect since it
was for another account (we call these wrong account variants).
A few errors were due to misspelling or variants of the correct
passwords, such as entering “access!ble” when the password was
“@ccessible” or entering “mybnakpwd” instead of “mybankpwd”
(we call these misspelled variants). The types of errors for text
passwords are summarized in Table 5.
As shown in Table 6, over half of the errors in the PassPoints
condition were due to forgetting one or more click-points within
the password. For one trial, the user remembered the pattern of the
password (a straight horizontal line), but thought it was approxi-
mately 15 pixels lower, aligning to a lower linear feature on the
Cars image (Figure 2), and tried to enter it 4 times in this shifted po-
sition. One user knew the correct password but one click-point was
slightly outside of the tolerance region, while another user entered
the correct click-points but in the wrong order. As expected, no
2In this and subsequent t-tests, if the value for degrees of freedom
(i.e., the number in parentheses) includes a decimal point, it is be-
cause Levene’s Test determined that equal variances could not be
assumed and so a Welch Two Sample t-test was used.
user confused their password from one account for another, since
all passwords were based on different images. In the PassPoints
condition, 8 out of 32 participants made recall errors.
Recall-2. Participants in both conditions made considerably more
errors after the two-week interval. In total, there were 216 Recall-2
errors in the Text condition, which is statistically greater than for
Recall-1 (t(122.39) = 4.61, p < .001). Similarly, the 106 Recall-
2 errors for PassPoints is significantly greater than for Recall-1
(t(67.23) = 5.99, p < .001).
Text participants were more likely to re-try entering their pass-
words, making on average 3.14 attempts per account, while Pass-
Points participants made 2.2 attempts on average (t(150) = 2.575,
p < .05) before either successfully entering their password or giv-
ing up. As discussed later, this occurred because participants in the
Text condition were more likely to cycle through their passwords
or variations of their passwords when they did not know the pass-
word for a particular account. The distribution of errors in Tables 5
and 6 show that for Recall-2, participants in both conditions were
more likely to enter passwords that had no relation to any of their
6 account passwords or that were variations of an existing pass-
word than during Recall-1. Interestingly, a common error in the
PassPoints condition was to have some, or all, of the x-coordinates
correct, but have incorrect y-coordinates. This occurred on several
images (not only Cars, as in Recall-1).
4.3 Timings
Table 7 and Figure 103 show the times taken to complete each
password-related step of the study and provide results of t-tests
comparing the times from each condition. These times represent
the total time spent during a given step. For example, the time to
login began when the login screen first appeared and continued un-
til the user entered their username and password, then successfully
logged in (including any errors committed).
During Password Generation, there is no consistent relationship
between the two conditions with respect to the amount of time
taken at each step. Participants were faster at creating PassPoints
passwords than text passwords. In contrast, participants were slower
at confirming their password in the PassPoints condition than in the
Text condition. During Login, participants took approximately the
same amount of time to enter their password in both conditions.
Recall-1. During Recall-1, participants were quicker at entering
PassPoints passwords (t(262.64) = 3.93, p < .001). This aligns
with the fact that participants made fewer errors in the PassPoints
condition and hence spent less time repeatedly entering their pass-
3Notched box-and-whisker graph can be interpreted as follows.
Each box indicates the Inter-Quartile Range (IQR - the interval
between the 25th and 75th percentiles) while the dashed lines
(whiskers) represent the first and fourth quartiles. The narrowest
part of the box indicates the median time for each phase. The
notches surrounding the median represent the confidence intervals.
If the notches of two boxes do not overlap, then their medians are
significantly different from each other at p < .05.
Table 3: Success rates of male and female participants for the Recall-2 step.
MText MPP
Male Female χ2 Male Female χ2
First Attempt 33% 28% not significant 43% 33% not significant
Within 3 Attempts 63% 57% not significant 71% 40% χ2(1, 65) = 6.51, p < .05
Multiple Attempts 80% 65% not significant 71% 40% χ2(1, 65) = 6.51, p < .05
Table 4: Recall errors per condition. Recall-1 includes 204 Text trials and 191 PP trials, while Recall-2 includes 90 Text trials and 65
PP trials. For the total number of errors, the percentage is calculated as the total number of errors divided by the total number of
Recall attempts for that condition.
Recall-1 Recall-2
MText MPP MText MPP
Number of trials with errors 65 (32%) 10 (5%) 62 (69%) 40 (62%)
Total number of errors 175 (49%) 18 (9%) 220 (78%) 106 (74%)
Number of trials where participants gave up 24 (12%) 2 (1%) 27 (30%) 28 (43%)
Number of participants who made errors 20/34 (59%) 8/32 (25%) 15/15 (100%) 10/11 (91%)
Table 5: Classification of recall errors for the Text condition
(MText).
Number of Occurrences
Type of error Recall-1 Recall-2
Wrong account 97 82
Wrong account variant 38 27
Misspelled variant 17 63
Unknown 21 44
Total number of errors 173 216
Table 6: Classification of recall errors for the PassPoints condi-
tion (MPP).
Number of Occurrences
Type of error Recall-1 Recall-2
1 click-point outside of tolerance area 1 0
Incorrect click-point order 1 3
Forgotten click-points 9 60
Click-point pattern shifted 6 15
Partial click-point pattern shifted 0 28
Total number of errors 17 106
word. If we consider only recall attempts where participants made
no mistakes (correctly entered their password on the first attempt),
then the difference in entry time is not significant. In other words,
during both the Login and Recall-1 steps of Session 1, participants
entered PassPoints passwords at least as quickly, or more quickly,
than text passwords.
Recall-2. There is no significant difference in the total amount
of time taken by participants in the Text and PassPoints conditions
in Recall-2. However, if we consider only those participants who
were successful on their first attempt, then Text participants were
quicker at entering these successful passwords.
4.4 Use of Mnemonics
When faced with the task of remembering multiple items, people
naturally turn to memory aids, or mnemonics. In our study, partic-
ipants in the PassPoints condition had a built-in mnemonic since
they could use the image as a memory aid. We gave no instructions
Figure 10: The total time for each step is shown in seconds.
The upper whiskers for the Recall-2 phase end at 90 seconds for
MText and 133 seconds for MPP. For the recall phases, the time
taken for accounts where passwords were correctly entered on
the first attempt are also shown as 1st Recall.
to participants in either condition as to what they could use as mem-
ory aids. No user tried to write down their passwords. The accounts
were identified by banners just above the username and password
entry fields (see Figures 8 and 9). We investigated whether various
account characteristics, such as account names, types, or banners,
were used as mnemonics.
We manually classified the passwords in the Text condition ac-
cording to whether they were related to their account. We found
that 23 out of 34 (68%) participants in the Text condition used
the account as a cue for at least one of their passwords. Some
passwords were directly linked with the account name. For ex-
ample, one user entered “instantmsg” for the instant messenger
Table 7: Timings for each step in seconds and results of t-tests comparing the timings for the two conditions.
Mean Median
Phase Step MText MPP MText MPP t-test
Password Create 34.6 30.7 27.1 27.2 not significant
Generation Confirm 8.9 13.2 7.4 11.5 (t(379) = 6.41, p < .001)
Login 11.3 13.4 9.2 12.0 (t(393) = 2.87, p < .01)
Retention Recall-1 29.3 15.1 14.0 11.8 (t(262.64) = 3.93, p < .001)
Recall-2 42.1 47.0 26.8 32.6 not significant
Recall-1 (correct on 1st attempt) 16.6 13.9 9.5 11.6 not significant
Recall-2 (correct on 1st attempt) 11.2 18.1 10.9 15.7 (t(34.08) = 3.51, p < .01)
account. Others were somewhat related, such as “lovelove” for
the online dating account. In total, 40% of text passwords were
related to their account. Other passwords appeared to be in lan-
guages we did not understand and may have corresponded to their
accounts, but we did not count these in our totals. We observed gen-
der differences in the use of mnemonics, with males being more
likely to create passwords that were directly related to their ac-
counts (t(32) = 2.07, p < .05).
We found no apparent link between passwords created in the
PassPoints condition and their associated accounts. Possible expla-
nations include that participants in the PassPoints condition either
did not need an additional mnemonic device since they could al-
ready use the password image, were unable to find a way to use the
account characteristics as memory aids for this type of password,
or did so in a manner that was not apparent to us.
Recall-1. Since the use of mnemonics only applies to text pass-
words, we compared success rates for participants who used account-
related passwords and those that did not for the Text condition. Par-
ticipants classified as having used account-related text passwords
had a 96% success rate for Recall-1 while those who did not had
an 83% recall success rate (χ2(1,204)=8.68, p < .01). The use
of account-related passwords made it significantly easier for Text
participants to recall their passwords during Session 1.
Recall-2. Similarly, we examined whether the use of account-
related passwords affected the Recall-2 success rates for the Text
condition. Those classified as having created account-related pass-
words had a 71% success rate for Recall-2, while those who did
not had a 69% success rate. A Chi-square (χ2) test shows that this
difference was not statistically significant. Participants who created
account-related passwords were no more likely to remember their
passwords after two weeks. In our study, creating account-based
text passwords helped with memorability in the short term, but it
did not provide an advantage after two weeks.
4.5 Patterns
We further evaluated whether participants were more likely to
use a coping strategy, such as selecting predictable passwords, when
faced with the task of creating and remembering several passwords.
4.5.1 Text Password Patterns
We visually inspected all of the passwords created in the Text
condition to see if a given user created similar passwords for all 6
of his or her accounts. Although they may help with memorabil-
ity, patterns across accounts are a security vulnerability because an
attacker who learns a user’s password for one (perhaps weakly pro-
tected) account may be able to more easily guess passwords for the
user’s other (perhaps more important) accounts.
We found that 18 out of 34 participants (53%) in the Text con-
dition created at least one pair of passwords that were similar to
each other. In total, 71 out of 204 passwords (35%) were obviously
related to other passwords created by the same user. An example
of such a pair included: “ins901333” for the instant messenger ac-
count and “lib901333” for the library account. In this case, the
passwords followed a pattern across passwords and were also di-
rectly related to the corresponding accounts. This particular user
applied this strategy to all 6 passwords.
4.5.2 PassPoints Patterns
We examined whether the PassPoints passwords followed sim-
ple patterns, based on previous work on click-based graphical pass-
words [8] which classified the types of patterns created by the click-
points of user-chosen passwords. The earlier study found that in
PassPoints, participants were likely to select click-points in simple
patterns such as a straight line or C- shape.
We tested the passwords from the current study for patterns, con-
cerned that participants may be even more likely to resort to com-
mon patterns if they had several passwords to remember. A com-
parison of the types of patterns found in the current study and those
from the previous PassPoints study [6] is provided in Figure 11.
We found no statistical difference between the patterns found in the
current study (where participants had to create and remember mul-
tiple passwords) and the earlier PassPoints lab study (where partic-
ipants had to remember only one password at a time). So although
we did see patterns, we have no evidence that they occur more fre-
quently than when participants had only one graphical password to
remember. It appears that contrary to text passwords, participants
do not resort to these types of patterns as an additional coping strat-
egy for handling multiple click-based graphical passwords.
We also examined each user’s 6 passwords to see if anyone con-
sistently picked passwords in a given pattern. Two participants had
4 out of 6 passwords following a “Z” pattern, but no other partic-
ipants used a specific pattern for the majority of their passwords.
It is possible that with additional experience with PassPoints pass-
words, users might develop different password selection strategies.
4.6 Other Security Measures
Rather than revisit known security issues (for example, see the
PassPoints discussion in Section 2), in this section we are inter-
ested in exploring whether the requirement of remembering multi-
ple passwords exacerbates these security issues.
4.6.1 Text Password Dictionary Attack
We tested whether the text passwords collected in this study were
weaker than those created when participants only had to remember
one password at a time, with respect to a dictionary attack using
John the Ripper [12]. This open-source software tool uses a sup-
plied dictionary to systematically try to guess passwords. We first
tested passwords using the free dictionary of 4 million entries, fol-
lowed by a second attack using a larger dictionary of 40 million
entries purchased from the John the Ripper web site.
Figure 11: Patterns [8] formed by the click-points of user pass-
words when connecting all 5 click-points of a password in se-
quence from the first to the last click-point. PPLab represents
an earlier PassPoints lab study [6,8] where participants remem-
bered only one password at a time. MPP represents the cur-
rent study where participants remembered multiple PassPoints
passwords. The differences between the two pattern sets are
not statistically significant.
The smaller dictionary cracked 9.8% (20 out of 204) of pass-
words, while the larger dictionary identified 15.2% (31 out of 204)
of passwords. These are lower success rates than we expected since
a visual inspection of the passwords revealed that many passwords
were quite simple. Examples of passwords that were not cracked
by John the Ripper include: “msnhotmail” for an email password,
“instantmsg” for an instant messenger account, and “inlibrary” for
a library account. In an earlier study of text passwords [16], 9.5%
(18 out of 190) of passwords were cracked using John the Ripper
with the same 4 million entry dictionary and 18.9% (36 out of 190)
of passwords with the larger dictionary.
Participants in the current multiple password study often selected
their passwords with some association to the account or with some
pattern across passwords. The default John the Ripper dictionaries
do not take into account these characteristics. It would seem rel-
atively simple, however, for an attacker to modify the dictionaries
to target specific types of accounts. For example, for an attack on
bank passwords, attackers could modify the dictionary to include
more financial terminology or terms associated with a particular
bank.
4.6.2 PassPoints Hotspot Formation
To evaluate PassPoints passwords for predictability, we com-
pared the distribution of click-points in the current study to those of
an earlier PassPoints study on the same images [6]. We wanted to
see whether there was increased clustering of click-points across
participants. Clustering occurs when several participants select
click-points in the same areas of the image. It is problematic be-
cause it signals that there are hotspots: areas of the image where
participants are more likely to select click-points. Attackers can
gather a small sample of passwords and use this information to pre-
dict hotspots and thus guess likely passwords [33]. In the current
study, if participants were compensating for having to remember
multiple passwords, they may opt to select more “obvious” (and
hence likely more memorable) click-points than they would other-
wise. We might therefore expect to see more clustering of click-
points in the current study than in the earlier PassPoints lab study
(where participants only had to remember one password at a time,
never revisiting previous images later in the study).
We used spatial statistics to evaluate whether participants who
had multiple PassPoints passwords were more likely to select click-
Figure 12: J-statistic at a radius of 9 pixels for the 6 images
used in the PassPoints condition. Participants in this study
(MPP) were no more likely to select click-points that clustered
than participants who only had to recall one password at a time
(PPLab).
points in common areas of the image. Spatial statistics are used
in areas such as Earth Sciences to evaluate the spatial distribution
of a dataset. The J-function [35] measures the level of clustering
of points within a dataset. It combines nearest-neighbour calcula-
tions with empty space measures for a given radius to measure the
clustering of points at that radius. We applied the J-function to the
dataset of click-points selected by the 32 PassPoints participants for
each image in this study (160 click-points per image). The earlier
PassPoints datasets [6] contained between 155 to 220 click-points
per image. We used a radius of 9 pixels to approximate the size
of the tolerance area (19x19 pixels) used to determine whether a
click-point was correct during password re-entry.
Figure 12 shows the results of the J-function for all 6 images.
It should be noted that these are discrete points and the lines were
added only for readability. J approaching 0 indicates that clusters
are occurring (J=0 indicates that all data points are in one cluster
within radius r). J approaching 1 means that the points are ran-
domly distributed, and J greater than 1 indicates that the points are
uniformly distributed (evenly spaced). Ideally, we want our click-
point distribution to be as close to J=1 as possible. We see from
Figure 12 that PassPoints suffers from clustering click-points. This
is a known issue with the original PassPoints scheme [7,13,20,33].
However, the important result here is that participants in the cur-
rent study were no more likely to select click-points that fell into
clusters than those participants who had only one password to re-
member. Figure 12 shows that the results for the two datasets are
very similar.
5. VALIDATION OF HYPOTHESES
We now revisit our hypotheses on multiple password interference
based on the results of our study.
1. Participants will have lower recall success rates with text
passwords than with PassPoints passwords. Hypothesis
partially supported. Users in the PassPoints condition had
significantly higher recall success rates in the short-term. How-
ever, after two weeks, participants in both groups had simi-
larly low success rates.
2. Participants in the Text condition are more likely than
PassPoints participants to use patterns across their pass-
words. Hypothesis partially supported. We found that 53%
of participants in the Text condition created passwords fol-
lowing a common pattern across their accounts. In compar-
ison, only two PassPoints participants used the same click-
point pattern for most of their accounts. Although it appeared
that Text passwords had more evidence of patterns, we could
not perform a direct comparison since the measures were dif-
ferent for the two types of passwords.
3. Participants will recall text passwords more slowly than
PassPoints passwords. Hypothesis partially supported. Over-
all, participants in the Text condition were slower to recall
their passwords than PassPoints participants in the short-term.
We believe this result will surprise many in the community.
One factor influencing this result is that Text participants
made more errors, so spent more time re-entering their pass-
word. When considering only successful first attempts, there
is no significant difference in password entry times between
the Text and PassPoints conditions. After two weeks, Text
participants who were successful on the first attempt entered
their password more quickly than PassPoints participants.
There was no significant difference between the two condi-
tions when the overall time for Recall-2 is considered.
4. Participants in the Text condition are more likely than
PassPoints participants to create passwords that are di-
rectly related to their corresponding accounts. Hypoth-
esis supported. We found that 68% of participants in the
Text condition used the account name or type as a mnemonic
to create a password that was obviously related to its ac-
count. We found no evidence that participants in the Pass-
Points condition created account-related passwords. In fact,
it is not clear how one would create account-related pass-
words in such click-based graphical password schemes.
5. Participants in the Text condition will make more recall
errors than participants in the PassPoints condition. Hy-
pothesis supported. Users in the Text condition made signif-
icantly more recall errors than those in the PassPoints con-
dition during both Recall-1 and Recall-2. Participants in the
Text condition were more likely to make repeated attempts at
entering their password, behaviour which is potentially dan-
gerous since it may reveal other passwords in the presence
of key loggers or if on phishing sites. PassPoints participants
opted to indicate that they had forgotten their password rather
than engaging in this potentially insecure behaviour. Having
passwords based on different images dissuaded users from
cycling through passwords.
6. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Cued-recall is a cognitively simpler task than uncued recall and
many users will attempt to turn remembering their password into
a cued-recall task. This user strategy often means that text pass-
words are weaker because they are likely based on some obvious
and common cues, such as account or website names.
In the short-term, PassPoints passwords are easier to recall than
text passwords when participants have several passwords to re-
member. We suspect that having a cue helped PassPoints partici-
pants remember which password was associated with each account.
It appears that participants in the Text condition created mnemonics
in order to have an association between an account (or its banner)
and its password. For example, many participants with text pass-
words included the word “email” in the password for their email
account. This common strategy appeared to help participants re-
call their passwords since short-term success rates were consider-
ably higher for those who used account-related passwords (see Sec-
tion 4.4). However, our results indicate that this strategy was not
effective when recalling passwords two weeks later.
Using account-related mnemonics is problematic for security. It
may make it easier to guess account-related passwords since the
mnemonic remains constant across all participants and is also avail-
able to attackers. It can also be problematic for usability when
participants are required to change their passwords. A user who
changes a password may still associate the account-related mnemonic
with the old password and have more difficulty remembering the
new password.
Prior to participating in our study, none of our PassPoints partici-
pants had previous experience with graphical passwords. However,
all our Text participants had much past experience with text pass-
words. As such, Text participants a substantial advantage when
recalling passwords two weeks later, since they had already devel-
oped behaviours to help them choose more memorable passwords
(see Section 4.4). As there was no difference in two-week recall
performance between the two conditions, the PassPoints partici-
pants also had an advantage: the image as a recall cue. Note how-
ever that the Text participants’ use of mnemonics inherently leads
to insecure passwords, while PassPoints’ image cue does not. Thus,
we believe that if a similar cueing mechanism could somehow be
added to text password systems, their security could be improved
without sacrificing memorability.
The role of the images as cues suggests that images provided by
the system should be distinct, otherwise confusion and interference
can become a problem. Our strong intuition is that users should
not be asked to remember different passwords on the same image,
as we suspect that interference problems would be highly likely in
that case. Not only is using the same images across systems prob-
lematic for usability, it also decreases security since users are likely
to re-use passwords. Similarly, a system could allow users to select
or upload personal images. However, this would enable password
reuse if users upload the same image for several accounts, which
has a security cost and may lead to greater memory interference if
the exact same password is not selected for each account. Addi-
tionally, Davis et al. [11] recommend against allowing user choice
in graphical passwords. Click-based graphical passwords can offer
a compromise by using system-assigned images and allowing user
choice of click-points within the image.
Our intent in this study was to examine the effects of password
interference on user behaviour and performance. We followed es-
tablished psychological methods for clearing working (short-term)
memory by administering a distraction task, and adopted a cogni-
tively challenging design to avoid ceiling effects [22]. However,
we acknowledge that this lab study does not mirror real-life usage.
Users are unlikely to create 6 new passwords one after the other
in quick succession in real life, or be asked to recall them all in
quick succession after two weeks (without having used any of them
in the intervening time). Albeit unusual, circumstances do some-
times require users to create multiple passwords in a short time pe-
riod, for example, when starting a new job. For the purpose of our
comparison, both the text passwords and the PassPoints passwords
were created and recalled under similar conditions. Furthermore,
although no one in our study wrote down their password, users of-
ten do so with their real passwords. This acts as a useful memory
aid, but has security risks if anyone gains access to a user’s written
list of passwords. And lastly, users were told in the instructions
to the study that their passwords were for 6 specific accounts. Al-
though this reflects the implicit reality in practice, mentioning this
explicitly may have primed users to select more account-specific
passwords. Despite these limitations, examining the issue of mul-
tiple password interference in a controlled laboratory setting is an
important step in understanding the effects of increased memory
load and the coping behaviours exhibited by users.
Many passwords created in both the Text and PassPoints con-
ditions were weak. For example, Text participants used account-
based passwords and used similar passwords across accounts, while
PassPoints participants created passwords that included patterns
and formed hotspots across participants. We believe that while
PassPoints passwords are often weak, this does not diminish the
results of our study, and may be addressed with alternative click-
based graphical password systems (see related discussion in Sec-
tion 2). Future work includes testing for multiple password inter-
ference with these alternative schemes and conducting a field study
to further examine the effect of multiple password interference in
a more ecologically valid setting. To provide more accurate com-
parison between graphical passwords and text passwords, it may
also be necessary to help users become more familiar with graph-
ical passwords beforehand so that their behaviour is more natural
and to avoid novelty effects.
7. CONCLUSION
Results of our lab study indicate that in the short-term, Pass-
Points passwords are more robust than text passwords against mul-
tiple password interference (assuming distinct background images).
Often, the usability of a system is tested in isolation but in the
case of passwords this is especially problematic because user be-
haviour may change as users accumulate passwords. We show that
in the short-term, participants could more easily remember multi-
ple click-based graphical passwords than multiple text passwords.
Participants in the Text condition made significantly more recall
errors and resorted to additional coping strategies such as using
account-based passwords or cycling through all of their passwords
when trying to recall their password. We believe the memory cue-
ing provided by click-based graphical passwords is at least part of
the reason for better user performance and that cueing should be
part of any recall-based authentication scheme, where possible.
After two weeks, recall of the passwords in the text and graphi-
cal conditions was not statistically different from each other. Given
that users were much more familiar with memorizing and recall-
ing text passwords, they were better positioned to remember these
passwords. However, this advantage was offset by the graphical
passwords’ built-in memory cue, which is a more secure memory
aid than users’ typical text password coping mechanisms. Our re-
sults raise an interesting research question for text passwords: can
cueing mechanisms be (safely) added to text passwords in order
to achieve the same memorability advantages seen in click-based
graphical passwords?
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